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FEDERAL CASES
ADMINISTRATVE LAW
New Judicial Remedy Under APA. In Deering Milliken, Inc. v.
Johnston,' the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that a
district court had jurisdiction to enjoin a regional director of the
National Labor Relations Board from proceeding with certain further
hearings that the Board had ordered. The court of appeals decided
that the plaintiff was not precluded from turning to the district court
for protection of its rights, because there were no administrative
remedies available.
In May 1956, the Textile Workers' Union of America obtained
authorization cards from a majority of the employees of the Darling-
ton Manufacturing Company.' The TWUA then requested that it be
recognized as the bargaining agent for the employees, but the company
refused to recognize and bargain with the union. The union immedi-
ately filed a petition for certification with the NLRB. In September,
the NLRB conducted an election at the Darlington Manufacturing
Company, and the TWUA won. In October 1956, the stockholders
voted to discontinue operations and liquidate the company, an action
that had been threatened if the union tried to represent the workers.
Because of the liquidation, the union in October 1956, filed unfair
labor practice charges with the NLRB under the Taft-Hartley Act.'
The general counsel of the NLRB offered to prove that the Darling-
ton Company was one of a chain of manufacturing mills controlled
by Deering Milliken & Co., Inc.4 This offer of proof was rejected by
the trial examiner. The Board decided that this issue had to be
decided before it would pass on the substantive issue of whether or not
Darlington had committed an unfair labor practice. Therefore, the
case was remanded to the trial examiner. At the hearing on remand,
1295 F.2d 856 (4th Cir. 1961).
2 For a complete discussion of the situation in the Darlington Mill, see Johannesen,
Case of the Rumaway Mill: Darlington Manufacturing Company, 12 LAB. L.J. 1189,
1192 (1961).
329 U.S.C. § 158(a) (1) (1959).
4 Darlington's assets, though liquidated, had not been completely distributed. Dar-
lington did have assets available for back pay (the remedy for the unfair labor
practice charged), but if all employees were entitled to back pay from 1956, the total
award might exceed Darlington's remaining assets. Also, even though an unfair labor
practice might have been committed, there was no reinstatement remedy at the
Darlington plant because of the cessation of business.
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it was found that Deering Milliken & Co., Inc. was a sales repre-
sentative for a group of manufacturing concerns (controlled by the
Milliken family) of which Darlington was a member, and that Deering-
Milliken itself was not engaged in manufacturing operations.' On the
basis of this finding the examiner concluded that Deering-Milliken did
not occupy the status of an employer under the National Labor Re-
lations Act. On December 31, 1959, the trial examiner recommended
that Deering be dismissed from the complaint.
In January 1961, the union petitioned to reopen and remand the
case as to Deering.6 At this time, the case was before the NLRB for
its decision and had been there since early 1960. Although more than
two years had passed since the first hearing on remand, no decision
had been made by the Board. The new remand was
for the purpose of taking newly discovered testimony and evidence
relating to (1) the Deering, Milliken & Co., Inc. press release ...
(2) the responsibility of Deering, Milliken & Co., Inc., either for the
unfair labor practices of Darlington Manufacturing Company or to
remedy those unfair labor practices and (3) such further evidence as
may be deemed proper and appropriate under the circumstances.7
Deering brought suit to enjoin the reopening and remand of the case.
The district court granted the injunction.8
On appeal the Board argued that the district court lacked juris-
diction for basically two reasons. First, the Board contended that
§ 10 (e) and (f) of the National Labor Relations Act9 provide methods
of review which are exclusive and, as there had not been any final
action by the Board, no other tribunal had power to act. Second, the
Board contended that under § 10(c) of the Administrative Procedure
Act Deering could not turn for relief to the federal courts until "final
agency action"' had been taken.
As to the Board's first contention, the court of appeals held that
§ 10(f) of the National Labor Relations Act did not provide adequate
5 Johannesen, supra note 2, at 1192-93.
6 The union made its petition because of newspaper articles which reported that
Deering had appointed presidents for its three manufacturing divisions. This was
inconsistent with the position that the company had taken when it denied being en-
gaged in manufacturing. This change was explained as resulting from a merger in
1960 of Deering Milliken & Co., Inc. into the Cotwood Manufacturing Corporation
and the latter had changed its name to Deering Milliken & Co., Inc.
7295 F.2d at 860.
8 Deering Milliken, Inc. v. Johnston, 193 F.Supp. 741 ('M.D.N.C. 1961).
929 U.S.C. § 160(e), (f) (1959)
10 Section 10(c) of the Administrative Procedure Act makes reviewable "every
final agency action for which there is no other adequate remedy in any court. ...
5 U.S.C. § 1009(c) (1959).
(VOL. 38
FEDERAL CASES
protection for the plaintiff's rights as required by APA § 6(a)." Sec-
tion 10(f) of the National Labor Relations Act did not give Deering
relief because it allows a right of appeal only after a final order of the
Board granting or denying the relief sought. Deering would be de-
prived of its rights under APA § 6(a) to have the matter before an
agency concluded with reasonable dispatch, if it had to wait for such a
final order. (Under § 10(f) of the National Labor Relations Act, the
delay of which Deering complained would terminate only on the
Board's volition.)
As to the Board's second contention, the court held that "final
action" under APA § 10(c) is not synonymous with a final order of
the Board granting or denying relief.'2 When the delay amounts to
a violation of APA § 6 (a) and to a legal wrong within the meaning of
APA § 10(a), 3 then final action under APA § 10(c) will be deemed
to have occurred."
It has long been held by the federal courts that one must exhaust
his administrative remedies' 5 before he can appeal to a federal court
for review, because Congress intended that administrative agencies
decide the questions falling within their jurisdiction and not the several
federal courts. In the Deering case, the question of exhaustion of
remedies was argued by the Board, but the court rejected this argu-
ment on the basis that there was no administrative remedy with which
the plaintiff could protect the right claimed. If hearings had been
held before a trial examiner pursuant to the second remand order,
Deering would have had no right to attack the propriety of the Board's
action in again remanding the case. Nor would Deering have had any
effective right to assert its contention that the second remand order,
and the holding of extended additional hearings pursuant to it, con-
stituted a present denial of Deering's rights under APA § 6.
As pointed out by Professor Davis, "No court requires exhaustion
"15 U.S.C. § 1005 (a) (1959). This section provides that " . .. Every agency
action shall proceed with reasonable dispatch to conclude any matter presented to it
except that due regard shall be had for the convenience and necessity of the parties
or their representatives . . .!
12This is the requirement for review under § 10(f) of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act. 29 U.S.C. § 160(f) (1959).
13 5 U.S.C. § 1009(a) (1959). This section sets forth the rights of review available
to an aggrieved party under the Administrative Procedure Act. "Any person suffering
any legal wrong because of any agency action . . . shall be entitled to judicial review
thereof." (Emphasis added.)
145 U.S.C. § 1009(c) (1959) : 'Every agency action made reviewable by statute
and every final agency action for which there is no adequate remedy in any court shall
be subject to judicial review... Y
15 Myers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corporation, 303 U.S. 41 (1938).
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when exhaustion will involve irreparable injury and when the agency
is palpably without jurisdiction .... ""s There was no claim of lack
of jurisdiction by Deering, but there was one of irreparable injury.
According to the court APA § 6(a) guarantees to litigants that admin-
istrative agencies will proceed with "reasonable dispatch." If, by ex-
cluding the federal courts, this congressionally created right would be
obliterated, then it would seem that Congress intended the courts to
protect this right with their equitable jurisdiction."7 If Congress did
not intend such protection, then the purpose of the Act could easily
be thwarted by the agencies.
Probably no better words sum up the lack of need for exhaustion
in a situation such as this than those of the United States Supreme
Court:
The ultimate test of reviewability is not to be found in an overrefined
technique, but in the need of the review to protect from the irreparable
injury threatened in the exceptional case by administrative rulings
which attach legal consequences to action taken in advance of other
hearings and adjudications that may follow, the results of which the
regulations purport to control. 8
One of the purposes of the Administrative Procedure Act appears
to be protection against the type of injury claimed in the Deering
case. By its ruling, the Board deprived Deering of a right which, in
this instance, could only be protected by a federal court. It thus
appears that the Deering case is one of those "exceptional" cases.
The court in the present case found jurisdiction in the district
court on the basis of APA § 10(e)." This section states that the
scope of review of the district court is such that the court can "hold
unlawful and set aside agency action . . . found to be . . . not in
accordance with the law.... ." Because of its long delay the Board
was held to have violated APA § 6(a). Thus, APA § 10(c) gave the
district court jurisdiction to prevent the remanding of the case.
Section 6(a) was held not to be a "precatory declaration," but
16 DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW § 20.01, at 56 (1958).
17 Justice Douglas in Switchmen's Union of North America v. National Mediation
Board, 320 U.S. 297, 300 (1943), held this to be the purport of previous decisions of
the Supreme Court.
18 Columbia Broadcasting System v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 425 (1942).
19 5 U.S.C. § 1009(e) (1959). Section 10(e) provides that the court ". . . shall
(A) compel agency action unlawfully withheld or unreasonably delayed; and (B) hold
unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions found to be (1) arbi-
trary, capricious, and abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with law
; (3) in excess of statutory jurisdiction, authority, or limitations, or short of
statutory right . .. ."
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rather an enforceable command under § 10(e). Upon examination
of the Senate committee reports," the court of appeals concluded that
Congress had intended the federal courts to protect rights created by
the APA and the agencies to "proceed with reasonable expedition."
The court in this case also found that the district court had juris-
diction on the basis of the 1958 Supreme Court decision of Leedom v.
Kyne.2' The plaintiff there was a union president who, individually
and in his official capacity, brought an action against the NLRB
members individually and in their official capacities. The action was
to set aside the certification of a bargaining unit which included both
professional and non-professional employees. The plaintiff claimed
that this was an unlawful act of the Board under § 9(b) (1) of the
National Labor Relations Act.' The Supreme Court held that the
district court had jurisdiction to set aside the Board's classification
of the bargaining unit that was being represented by the union.
The statute involved in the Kyne case said the Board "shall not"2
include both professional and non-professional employees in the same
bargaining unit, unless the former so choose. The statute involved in
the Deering case is also mandatory, and says the "agency shall proceed
with reasonable dispatch . . ."" to conclude the business before it.
(Emphasis added.) Because of the similarity in the statutory language
it appears that the court in the Deering case properly relied on Kyne.
In Kyne, the Court pointed out that under the circumstances, " 'ab-
sence of jurisdiction of the federal courts would mean a sacrifice or
obliteration of a right which Congress' has given professional em-
ployees, for there is no other means, within their control, to protect
and enforce that right." 5 In the Deering situation, rights under APA
§ 6 (a) can be enforced only in the federal courts. If Deering had to
wait for the trial examiner to re-hear the case and could appeal to the
federal courts only after the Board had decided there would be no
remedy available to protect the right it was being deprived of.
Deering indicates that new doors have been opened to the federal
courts under the Administrative Procedure Act. The case augments
the remedies available under the Kyne decision. On the basis of
Deering, a complainant would not have to show that a right under
2 0 Administrative Procedure Act, Legislative History, S. Doc. No. 248, 79th Cong.,
2d Sess. 263-65, 326-27, 217, 278-79, 281-82 (1946).21358 U.S. 184 (1958).
2229 U.S.C. § 159(b) (1) (1959).
23 Ibid.




the National Labor Relations Act was being violated in order for a
district court to acquire jurisdiction. Now, all that the complainant
must show is that he is being deprived of a right under the Adminis-
trative Procedure Act and that there are no other remedies available
to enforce that right.
JoN A. LUNDIN
Notice of Unpublished Rules. In the recent case of United States
v. A arons,1 the failure of the Coast Guard to publish one of its sub-
stantive rules in the Federal Register was held not to bar conviction for
violation of the rule where the defendants had actual knowledge of the
contents of the rule violated. In so holding the Court of Appeals for
the Second Circuit refused to follow the Ninth Circuit decision to the
contrary in Hotch v. United States.'
The defendants in the Aarons case were members of a group called
the Committee for Non-Violent Action (CNVA), which was conducting
demonstrations against the Navy's Polaris program at the Electric
Boat Company's plant in New London, Connecticut. In response to a
request from the Navy, the Commander of the Third Coast Guard
District issued a "Special Notice" by which he closed a section of the
Thames River directly in front of the Company's property to all per-
sons and vessels between specified hours. The purpose of the closure
was to afford a clear area for the launching of the nuclear submarine
Ethan Allen. The "notice" was published in the Local Notice to
Mariners, and a copy was sent by registered mail to the CNVA which
acknowledged it. It was not, however, published in the Federal
Register.'
On the date of the launching the defendants attempted to enter the
restricted area in two boats and to obstruct the launching. They were
intercepted and shown a copy of the order closing the area. Neverthe-
less they continued into the area and were apprehended and taken into
custody by the Coast Guard.
After trial and conviction for violation of the rule,4 defendants
appealed, contending (among other things) that the "Special Notice"
was invalid because it had not been published in the Federal Register
1310 F.2d 341 (2d Cir. 1962).
2 212 F.2d 280 (9th Cir. 1954).
3 United States v. Aarons, 310 F.2d 341, 343 (2d Cir. 1962).
4 Defendants were convicted under 50 U.S.C. § 192 (1958) of a knowing violation
of an order issued under 50 U.S.C. § 191 (1958).
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